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No MORE TEARS: ANTI-SYMPATHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ATTEMPT TO DISALLOW IMPULSIVE EMOTION
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no area of criminal law where it is of more significance to
ensure fairness than in a capital punishment trial. To guarantee a just
outcome, it is crucial to guard against the influence of impermissible
factors during both the trial and sentencing stages. Post-judgment ap-
peals provide further opportunity for higher courts to correct injustice
by vacating a death sentence founded upon unconstitutional grounds.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Geor-
gia.' The Court, in a five to four margin, held that capital punishment
was unconstitutional under then-existing statutes.2  Post-Furman
Supreme Court cases have specifically addressed prosecutors' comments
which may diminish a jury's sense of responsibility and anti-sympathy
jury instructions in death penalty cases.3 These holdings provide guide-
lines for future court proceedings in order to avoid violation of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights.
In Parks v. Brown, 4 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed two
separate issues in light of these new Supreme Court guidelines. The
first issue presented by the petitioner-appellant in Parks, claimed that
the prosecutor's remarks misled the jury by impermissibly diluting their
sense of responsibility when imposing sentence. 5 The petitioner's sec-
ond contention focused on an anti-sympathy jury charge in the penalty
phase of the trial.6 The petitioner claimed that this instruction violated
his eighth amendment rights.
7
This article examines the significance of the Tenth Circuit decision
in Parks, and the possible future affect it will have on prosecutor's com-
ments and anti-sympathy jury instructions. Furthermore, it will discuss
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness And Discrimination Under Post Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
3. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) where the Supreme Court found
that the prosecutor impermissibly mislead the jury as to its responsibility in the sentencing
decision; see also, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) where the Court, in a five to
four decision, upheld an anti-sympathy jury instruction.
4. District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF 77-3159, aff'd, Parks v. State,
651 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155
(1983), cert. denied on post conviction proceedings, Parks v. Oklahoma, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984),
habeas corpus proceeding, Parks v. Brown, 823 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1987), opinion withdraum
and republished, Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1987), different results reached on
reh'g en bane, Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
After this article was written the Supreme Court granted Oklahoma's petition for cer-
tiorari and agreed to review the Tenth Circuit decisions in Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545
(10th Cir. 1988) (en bane), and Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1987). See Saffle
v. Parks, 109 S. Ct. 1930 (1989).
5. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1549.
6. Id. at 1552.
7. Id.
645
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the Parks opinion in light of the Supreme Court's position on
prosecutorial conduct and the fine line the Court has drawn in uphold-
ing certain anti-sympathy jury instructions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Caldwell v. Mississippi
s
The issue presented to the Supreme Court for review in Caldwell
was whether a capital punishment sentence could be upheld when the
jurors had been led to believe that the "responsibility for determining
the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with
the appellate court which later reviews the case." 9
Upon review, the Supreme Court invalidated the petitioner's death
sentence,' 0 holding that the prosecutor had wrongfully minimized the
jury's sense in the importance of its role."I The prosecutor's argument
suggested to the jury that the ultimate responsibility for the imposition
of the death penalty did not rest with them, but with the appellate
court.12 The assistant district attorney had repeatedly informed the ju-
rors that their capital punishment decision was automatically reviewable
by a higher court.'
3
Another factor which affected the Court's judgment in Caldwell was
the trial court's affirmation of the prosecutor's remarks. In response to
the defense's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, the trial
judge overruled the objection by addressing the prosecutor,". . . go on
and make the full expression so the jury will not be confused. I think it
proper that the jury realizes that it [the jury's decision] is reviewable
automatically as the death penalty commands."' 14 The Supreme Court
highlighted the trial court's mistake when it asserted, "[tihe trial judge
in this case not only failed to correct the prosecutor's remarks, but in
fact openly agreed with them; he stated to the jury that the remarks were
proper and necessary, strongly implying that the prosecutor's portrayal
of the jury's role was correct."'
5
The Supreme Court in Caldwell held that it is "constitutionally im-
permissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sen-
tencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere."16
8. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
9. Id. at 323.
10. The petitioner shot and killed a small grocery store owner while in the process of
robbing it. He was later convicted of murder and a death sentence was imposed. Id. at
324.
11. Id. at 328-29.
12. Id. at 323.
13. Id. at 325.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 339.
16. Id. at 329.
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B. Dutton v. Brown 17 & Coleman v. Brown' 8
Dutton v. Brown and Coleman v. Brown are two post-Caldwell cases de-
cided by the Tenth Circuit. In neither instance did the court of appeals
find the prosecutor's remarks had impermissibly violated the defend-
ant's constitutional rights. The prosecutor's closing remarks in Dutton
underscored the fact that the jury is part of the whole justice system.
The prosecutor emphasized that jurors do not "function as individuals"
but are "part of the process."' 19 The Tenth Circuit held that the com-
ments, taken in context, were permissible. The court found that "[t]he
statement was not designed to, nor did it, suggest to the jury that it was
not ultimately responsible for deciding Mr. Dutton's punishment."
20
Similarly, in Coleman, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the "dangers
the [Supreme] Court identified in Caldwell are not present in the remarks
made here."'2 1 The prosecutor in Coleman did not attempt to diminish
the jury's accountability in a capital punishment conviction. Instead, the
prosecutor emphasized that the defendant bore the burden of his pres-
ent situation. 2 2 Looking at the prosecutor's remarks as a whole, it was
evident that the he did not intend to dilute the jury's sense of duty.
Commenting on the jury's task, the prosecutor stated, "[i]t will be one
of the most serious things you've every done in your life and it won't be
easy . .. [i]t's a grave responsibility you have . . . and it's not easy to
shoulder that kind of load, but somebody's got to."
2 3
C. California v. Brown
24
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that the respondent's eighth
amendment rights had not been violated by a jury instruction. 2 5 The
instruction informed the jurors that they "must not be swayed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling" during the penalty phase of a murder trial.
2 6
The five to four decision, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the
majority opinion, found that the Court's eighth amendment criteria had
been met. 27 Past Supreme Court holdings have established two prereq-
uisites for valid death sentencing. First, the jury may not act with unre-
strained discretion. This is to prevent the administration of arbitrarily
17. 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
18. 802 F.2d 1227 (10th Cir. 1986).
19. Dutton, 812 F.2d at 596.
20. Id. at 597. The defendant had been sentenced to death for killing a bar owner
while robbing the establishment. The sentence was modified to life imprisonment by the
Tenth Circuit due to error. The error was the exclusion of mitigating evidence offered by
the petitioner's mother. The trial court refused to allow her to testify because she had
remained in court after a sequestration order.
21. Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 1986).
22. Id. at 1241.
23. Id.
24. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
25. Id. at 543.
26. Id. at 539.
27. Id.
19891
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arrived at penalties. 28 Next, the defendant "must be allowed to intro-
duce any relevant mitigating evidence"
2 9 regarding his character.3 0
In reaching its conclusion, the majority stressed the exact wording
of the jury charge at issue. "What the Rehnquist group deemed disposi-
tive was the inclusion of the adjective 'mere.' "3 1The Court found that
the respondent had incorrectly focused solely on the noun "sympa-
thy."'3 2 The Court maintained that from the inclusion of the word
"mere," a juror would understand that the jury should not rely on "ex-
traneous emotional factors" when making its death sentence
determination.
3 3
The Court reasoned that the directive would limit the jury's consid-
eration to matters introduced into evidence, while conveying the
message that the jury must "ignore ... the sort of sympathy that would
be totally divorced from the evidence."13 4 An instruction which prohib-
its the jury from consideration of extrinsic factors does not violate the
eighth amendment.
3 5
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor concurred with the major-
ity in Brown. She noted that imposition of the death penalty involves a
"reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."'3 6 (emphasis in original).
However, Justice O'Connor cautioned that anti-sympathy instructions
may mislead jurors "into believing that mitigating evidence about a de-
fendant's background or character ... must be ignored."
3 7
III. PARKS V. BROWN
A. History of Proceedings
The District Court of Oklahoma County by jury conviction found
Robyn Leroy Parks, petitioner-appellant, guilty of first-degree murder of
a gas station attendant. The same jury sentenced Parks to death. "Parks'
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals." '3 8 The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari with Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting.
3 9
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987).
30. The respondent in this case was convicted of forcible rape and first degree murder
of an adolescent girl. At the penalty phase, the defendant presented character witnesses to
testify to his peaceful nature. Id. at 539.
31. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 19, Parks v. Brown, 860
F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-1400). [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en
banc)].




36. Id. at 841.
37. Id. at 842.
38. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1498 (10th Cir. 1987).
39. Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
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Parks then attempted to challenge his post-conviction proceedings
in Oklahoma. He was denied relief in state district court and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 40 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
4 '
"Having exhausted his state remedies, Parks filed a habeas corpus pe-
tition in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma."-4 2 Parks' execution, scheduled eleven days from his date of
appeal, was stayed by the district court pending its decision. The district
court denied relief and dismissed all claims.
43
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed
to hear Parks' appeal. Circuit Judges Monroe G. McKay, Bobby R.
Baldock and Robert H. McWilliams sat on the review panel. The panel
affirmed the district court finding in a split decision 4 4 with two of the
judges, McKay and Baldock supporting a petition for rehearing. The
full court of appeals granted an en banc rehearing with respect to the
sentencing issues on which the panel had been divided.
45
B. Facts
The facts of the case presented by the state which led to Parks' con-
viction of first degree murder are as follows. Abdullah Ibrahim, a part-
time Gulf gas station attendant in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was found
dead of a gun shot wound on the morning of August 17, 1977. There
were no signs of struggle and no money or property had been taken.
The police found an unused credit card slip at the station which led to
the discovery of a car containing Parks' possessions. 46 This link caused
Parks to become the chief suspect of the homicide. At this time Parks
was in California, but frequently called a friend of his in Oklahoma,
James Clegg. Clegg allowed the police to tape two of his phone conver-
sations with Parks.
4 7
In these two conversations, Parks admitted to shooting Ibrahim be-
cause Parks intended to use a stolen credit card to buy gas and feared
the attendant would call the police.4 8 Based on this evidence, the jury
40. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unreported order and
opinion. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1498.
41. Parks v. Oklahoma, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
42. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 2.
43. However, the district court did grant a Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal.
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 3.
44. Judge McKay dissented in a separate opinion as to three of appellant's claims.
These claims involved, (1) the jury instruction on second-degree murder; (2) the prosecu-
tor's comments to the jury during the penalty phase; and, (3) the propriety of the anti-
sympathy jury instruction. In the second claim, the appellant claimed the prosecutor's
comments minimized the importance of the jury's role in pronouncing sentence. Parks v.
Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987). (McKay, J., dissenting).
45. Judge McKay "would have ordered a new trial for both the guilt and penalty
phases." Brief for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 3.
46. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1498.
47. Clegg's assistance was motivated by the prospect of a $5,000 reward from Gulf,
and the possibility that the authorities might dismiss a burglary charge against him. Brief
for Petitioner-Appellant (en banc) at 5.
48. During the trial, Parks denied killing Ibrahim. He testified he was somewhere
1989] 649
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found Parks guilty of first degree murder. After further hearing, the
same jury sentenced him to death.
4 9
C. The en banc Opinion of the Tenth Circuit
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two of the petitioner's con-
tentions. 50 The first argument claimed that the prosecutor's comments
to the jury impermissibly diluted the juror's sense of responsibility in
violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi.5 1 The second argument asserted that
the anti-sympathy jury instruction violated the petitioner's eighth
amendment rights.
52
The Tenth Circuit reversed the petitioner's death sentence. Six of
the circuit judges held that the anti-sympathy jury charge violated the
defendant's constitutional rights. While in a seven to three split regard-
ing the prosecutor's remarks, the court concluded that Caldwell was inap-
plicable to the instant case.
1. Majority Opinion - Issue I
Judge Ebel, writing for the majority, affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the prosecutor's remarks "did not violate Caldwell by improp-
other than the gas station at the time of the killing and presented a witness to corroborate
his alibi. He explained the presence of the credit card slip by stating that he had
purchased gas at that particular gas station a few days prior to the shooting but did not
have cash with him. Parks claimed that the attendant copied his license number and later
that same day he came back to the station and paid for the gas. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d
1496, 1499 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, during the first taped telephone conversation with Clegg, Parks admitted to
killing the attendant because he did not want the police to discover his use of the stolen
credit card. Also, if the police caught him they might discover that he had guns and dyna-
mite in the trunk of his car. (The reason Parks had these explosives was never explained in
the appellate court record). Id. at 1499.
49. "The jury found only one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances that
were charged-that the murder was 'committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or prosecution.' " Parks, 860 F.2d 1545, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
The other two aggravating factors which the jury rejected were, (1) that Parks would prob-
ably commit other crimes in the future which would pose a continued threat to society, and
(2) that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious and cruel." Id. at 1547 n.l.
At the time of the homicide, Parks was 22 years old. When Parks was 17, he was
charged with robbery by force and fear to which he pled guilty. "In brief, the facts were
that Parks, and two other black youths, accosted a white student in a school yard and after
a fight took six cents from the victim." A few years later Parks was convicted for attempted
burglary. This is the history of his prior convictions. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1502
(10th Cir. 1987).
50. The three member Tenth Circuit panel considered seven arguments on peti-
tioner's appeal. These included (1) an instruction on the lesser offense of second-degree
murder; (2) admission of petitioner's prior robbery conviction; (3) the prosecutor's com-
ments to the jury during penalty phase (one of the two arguments reconsidered en banc);
(4) the trial court's anti-sympathy instruction (the second contention re-examined on ap-
peal en banc); (5) instructions which addressed aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
(6) whether petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase;
and (7) whether Oklahoma arbitrarily applied the death penalty in a racially discriminatory
manner. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (1987).
51. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
52. For purposes of discussion the two arguments heard by the Tenth Circuit in the
Parks case will be referred to as issue I and issue II. Issue I refers to the prosecutor's
closing remarks while issue II involves the anti-sympathy jury charge.
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erly reducing the jury's sense of responsibility for the sentencing
decision."' 53 The court approached its examination of issue I in a two-
step inquiry.54 First, it determined whether the prosecutor's statements
were the type of remarks covered by Caldwell. This means that the state-
ments must tend to alleviate thejurors of responsibility for their actions.
If the first criteria is met, then the "second inquiry evaluates the effect of
such statements on the jury. '" 5 5 The Tenth Circuit never progressed to
step two because it concluded that the comments did not violate the
petitioner's constitutional rights.
56
The court of appeals analyzed issue I in light of Darden v. Wain-
wright.5 7 This Supreme Court case elaborated on the Caldwell doc-
trine. 58 In Darden, the Court asserted that a Caldwell violation occurs
only when the comments "mislead the jury as to its role. . . in a way that
allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing
decision."'59 (emphasis added).
Although the prosecutor told the jurors in Parks that they had "be-
come a part of the criminal-justice system that says when anyone does
this [crime], that he must suffer death . . . so it's not on your con-
science," 60 the majority of the court believed that the prosecutor's
other comments had adequately stressed the gravity of the jury's
responsibility.6 1
Besides the prosecutor's statements which emphasized the jurors'
role in the process, the court found other portions of the trial protected
against the danger of diluting or trivializing the jury's sense of duty. Un-
like Caldwell,62 the judge's instructions 6 3 in Parks underscored the ju-
rors' function as the penalty assessors. The defense counsel's
statements in response to the prosecutor's arguments also served to
counteract any misunderstanding the jury members may have had as to
their function.
Last, the Tenth Circuit examined the Parks facts in light of its previ-
53. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1548.
54. Id. at 1549.
55. Id.
56. The second step would determine the effect such statements have on the jury dur-
ing the sentencing phase, possibly rendering the sentence unconstitutional. Id.
57. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
58. Supra note 16.
59. Darden, 477 U.S. at 184 n.15.
60. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1564 (10th Cir. 1988) (McKayJ., concurring and
dissenting).
61. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "We are sorrowful that you do
have a duty that you must perform..." and "[y]ou consider all of this evidence .... Can
you think of a more proper case ... in which your verdict assessing death would be more
proper?" The Tenth Circuit interpreted these statements as clear messages to the jury
that they had the ultimate responsibility in sentencing. Id. at 1550.
62. The misleading information regarding the jury's role was-compounded by the trial
court when it supported the assistant district attorney's remarks. The court stated, "I
think it proper that the jury realizes that it [the jury's decision] is reviewable automatically
as the death penalty commands." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 325 (1985).
63. The jury instructions stated, "It is now your duty to determine the penalty which
shall be imposed for this offense." Parks, 860 F.2d at 1551.
1989]
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ous holdings in Dutton and Coleman. In Dutton, the Tenth Circuit held
that the prosecutor's statements telling jurors that they are "part of the
process" 64 and that "you [the jurors] are not here in your individual
capacities ' 65 were not constitutionally impermissible. Instead, the court
found such comments "merely underscored that the jury was part of the
whole system ofjustice." 66 The court of appeals held that similar state-
ments in Parks were equally innocuous.
The majority in Parks also noted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Coleman. The prosecutor in Coleman emphasized that the defendant bore
the burden of his present plight because he was the perpetrator of the
crimes committed. The court of appeals found that these remarks did
not pose the dangers the Supreme Court identified in Caldwell.6 7 The
Coleman opinion went on to state, "[t]his method of argument does not
permit the jury to rely on someone else to make the ultimate sentencing
decision .... ",68
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the prosecutor's com-
ments viewed in context "did not unconstitutionally diminish the jurors'
sense of authority and responsibility for the sentencing decision."
'69
Therefore, there was no Caldwell violation in the Parks case.
2. Majority Opinion - Issue II
The anti-sympathy jury instruction under attack in the Parks case
reads as follows: "You must avoid any influence of sympathy, senti-
ment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sen-
tence .... ."70 Petitioner contended that this charge violated his
constitutional rights. The majority of the Tenth Circuit agreed.
7 1
The first premise which the court relied upon in reaching its conclu-
sion is found in the United States Supreme Court case of Mills v. Mary-
land.7 2 The Mills precedent holds that if there is a possibility that a
"reasonable juror could construe the instruction ... as to make its sen-
tencing decision improper . . . 73 this error is enough to require
resentencing.
74
The next question which the Tenth Circuit had to decide was
whether the anti-sympathy charge in Parks would skew a jury's decision
making process. The court approached this question by comparing a
similar jury instruction found in California v. Brown, 75 and analyzing the
Supreme Court's reasons for its holding in Brown.
64. Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1987).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 597.
67. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1550.
68. Id. at 1551.
69. Id. at 1552.
70. Id. at 1548.
71. Id. at 1552.
72. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988).
73. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1553.
74. Id.
75. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
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The jury instructions in the two cases were similar, but not identi-
cal. In Brown, the charge cautioned the jurors not to be swayed by "mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling."' 76 On the other hand, the jury in Parks was directed not
to allow "any influence of sympathy . . .,,77 to bias its determination.
(emphasis added). The court found this difference decisive, because the
Supreme Court established the word "mere" as the crucial point in its
decision to uphold the instruction. The Court concluded that a juror
would understand "mere sympathy" as "a directive to ignore only the
sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence ad-
duced during the penalty phase." 78 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit re-
solved that "any" is an all-inclusive term, which "carries with it the
danger of leading the jury to ignore sympathy that is based on the miti-
gating evidence."
'79
Previous Supreme Court cases have held that it is a "capital defend-
ant's constitutional right to present and have the jury consider mitigat-
ing evidence" 80 and "[t]he sentencer . . . may not be precluded from
considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.' "81 Based on these
precepts, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Parks jury charge had
"improperly undermined the jury's ability to consider fully petitioner's
mitigating evidence" in making its sentencing decision, thereby violat-
ing the defendant's constitutional rights. 82
3. Issue I: Dissenting Opinion
Both Chief Judge Holloway and Circuit Judge McKay concluded
that there was a Caldwell violation in the Parks trial. In his dissent, Mc-
Kay asserted that the prosecutor's remarks were improper "because they
diffuse the juror's sense of responsibility for the death sentence by inti-
mating that the jury is performing a dispassionate, mechanical"
function.
83
In the opinion of both judges, the absence of any corrective instruc-
tion by the court, combined with the damaging effect of the prosecutor's
remarks resulted in an unreliable jury verdict which could not be
sustained.
84
4. Issue II: Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Anderson criticized the majority for its limited
focus on the modifier "any" in the anti-sympathy charge. 8 5 Judge An-
76. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
77. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1552.
78. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542.
79. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1553.
80. Id. at 1554.
81. Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)).
82. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1556.
83. Id. at 1564. (McKayJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1560. (Holloway C.J., concurring and dissenting).
85. Id. at 1566. (Anderson J., dissenting).
1989]
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derson believed the majority's assumption that the jury could miscon-
strue the charge and thus ignore mitigating evidence was fallacious.
Instead, he argued that the anti-sympathy instruction "sensibly cautions
the jury against imposing sentence simply on the basis of arbitrary
emotions." 8 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Prosecutor's Comments Concerning the Jury's Responsibility
From the trilogy of Tenth Circuit decisions, comprised of Coleman,
Dutton, and Parks, it appears egregious prosecutorial remarks will not
invalidate a death sentence if the court believes the defense counsel ade-
quately counteracted the remarks, or the trial court corrected any mis-
conception the comments may have caused.8 7 In short, the defendant's
eighth amendment rights are violated only if the remarks render the trial
fundamentally unfair. The court of appeals justified its holdings in Dut-
ton and Coleman by resolving that the prosecutorial comments did not
impermissibly taint the trial. However, the court's rationale in Parks is
less convincing.
The Supreme Court, in Caldwell, announced the principle that "it is
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determina-
tion made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsi-
bility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere." 8 8 Nevertheless, that is exactly what has occurred in Parks.
The challenged portion of the prosecutor's argument reads, in part, as
follows:
[Y]ou know, as you as jurors, you really, in assessing the death
penalty, you're not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You
have just become a part of the criminal justice system that says
when anyone does this, that he must suffer death. So all you're
doing is you're just following the law, and what the law says,
and on your verdict-once your verdict comes back in, the law
takes over. The law does all of these things, so it's not on your
conscience. You're just a part of the criminal justice system
that says when this type of type [sic] of thing happens, that
whoever does such a horrible, atrocious thing must suffer
death. 89
This argument "offers jurors a view of their role which might fre-
quently be highly attractive." 90 Perhaps this view is highly attractive,
but its basis is incorrect. The prosecutor's remarks here are in direct
violation of Caldwell and are designed specifically to undermine the
jury's sense of responsibility for the "life-or-death determination" 9 1
86. Id.
87. It appears the Tenth Circuit adheres to the Supreme Court's permissive position
on prosecutorial remarks. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
88. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
89. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1503 (10th Cir. 1987).
90. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 332-33.
91. Brief for Petitioner-appellant (en banc) at !1.
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they make. Instead, the prosecutor furnished the jury with the comfort-
ing notion that "the law" commanded the jury to find Parks guilty and
"the law" would be answerable for his execution. 9 2
To further alleviate each juror's conscience, the prosecutor invoked
God in his argument. "Now that's man's law. But God's law is the very
same. God's law says that the murderer shall suffer death. So don't let
it bother your conscience, you know."
9 3
Unlike Parks, the challenged comments in Dutton and Coleman were
not aimed at reducing the jury's sense of duty. In Dutton, the remarks in
dispute simply placed the jury's role in the context of the judicial system.
While the prosecutor in Coleman did maintain that the defendant was
responsible for his plight, he also stressed that the jury alone bears the
burden of imposing judgment.
Both ChiefJudge Holloway and Judge McKay raised a crucial point
in their dissents. 9 4 In Parks, the record is devoid of any curative lan-
guage by the court. The trial court did not attempt to remedy any mis-
leading remarks, or supply additional instructions to the jury after the
prosecutor spoke.95 In disagreement with the majority, both dissenters
believed the prosecutor's comments were improper. Therefore, the ab-
sence of any corrective instructions by the trial court to "effectively neu-
tralize the prosecutor's impermissible remarks," 9 6  resulted in
constitutional error.
97
The omission of judicial clarification was one reason for the
Supreme Court's holding in Caldwell.9 8 The Court stated in Caldwell,
"the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate de-
termination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger
that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its
role." 99
In their brief, respondent-appellees argued that the prosecutor's
comments were constitutional because they did not actually mislead the
jury into believing that an appellate court or some other authority would
decide whether to impose the death penalty.' 0 0 This is fallacious rea-
soning. Although the prosecutor did not specifically ascribe sentencing
authority to another body, his remarks did relieve the jurors of their
92. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
93. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1503.
94. Supra note 84.
95. Parks v. Brown 860 F.2d 1545, 1560 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Holloway, C.J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. at 1565.
97. For a study on the impact of judicial instructions and the effect of nullification
information to a jury see Horowitz,Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions, Argu-
ments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988).
98. Also, the opinion noted that the trial judge supported the prosecutor's remarks,
thus sending a strong message to the jurors that the statements by the prosecutor were
correct. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339 (1985).
99. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
100. Brief for Respondent-Appellees on Rehearing (en banc), Parks v. Brown, 860
F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-1400). [hereinafter, Brief for Respondent-Appellees
(en banc)].
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personal responsibility by claiming that "the law" required the jury to
find Robyn Parks guilty. The prosecutor asserted, "all you're doing is
you're just following the law, and what the law says ... once your verdict
comes back in, the law takes over. The law does all of these things, so it's
not on your conscience." 10' (emphasis added). The prosecutor's descrip-
tion of the jury's role reduces it to a mechanical performance of adjudi-
cation. The jurors are stripped of their free choice by the implicit
message that they must find Parks guilty, because this enigmatic crea-
ture, "the law," requires the death penalty.
A worrisome aspect of the Tenth Circuit opinion in Parks is the ma-
jority's partial reliance on the defense counsel to counteract any of the
prosecutor's misrepresentations. The court stated that "defense coun-
sel, in his closing argument, responded directly to the prosecutor's com-
ments, thereby underscoring to the jury the full scope of its
responsibility."'10 2 This approach reduces a constitutional question to a
contest of persuasion. If the court allows the opposing parties to debate
the responsibility of the jury, or manipulate the jury's understanding of
its responsibility, a juror could end up believing whichever side is most
convincing, or most appealing.' 0 3 When this occurs, the court is no
longer adequately guarding against impermissible comments. This ap-
proach could potentially allow an eighth amendment violation to occur
because the court mistakenly believes any inappropriate statements have
been adequately corrected by opposing counsel.
B. The Anti-Sympathy Jury Instruction
The Tenth Circuit rightfully concluded that the anti-sympathy jury
instruction in Parks was unconstitutional. Interestingly, the court used
the Supreme Court's reasoning in California v. Brown 104 to arrive at an
opposite holding in the instant case. Like Brown, the outcome of the
Parks appeal hinged on the court's interpretation of one word. This key
word distinguished the Parks jury charge from the Brown precedent.
The pivotal word in the Parks jury charge was the adjective "any."
Since the purpose of mitigating evidence is to humanize the defendant,
the court concluded that the use of the word "any" as a modifier was
overly inclusive, virtually prohibiting any sympathetic response from the
jury, even a response predicated on mitigating evidence. The defend-
ant's background and character information are intentionally presented
to the jury to invoke feelings of compassion.' 0 5 Thus, the inclusion of
the word "any" could easily cause the jury to incorrectly believe that no
101. Parks, 840 F.2d at 1503.
102. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1550. Granted, the Parks opinion acknowledged that the
judge's instructions re-emphasized "that the sentencing responsibility rested with this
jury." Id. at 1551.
103. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1985). The Court recognizes
that an impermissible argument may be "highly attractive" to a juror, since it errone-
ously relieves the jury of its responsibility to impose judgment.
104. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
105. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1555 (10th Cir. 1988).
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feelings of sympathy for the defendant were acceptable. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent in California v. Brown, 10 6 "forbidding the
sentencer to take sympathy into account, this language on its face pre-
cludes precisely the response that a defendant's evidence of character
and background is designed to elicit .... 107
What is disturbing about the Parks decision, in light of future cases,
is that it appears the use of one word instead of another will be decisive
as to whether the charge is deemed constitutional or not.' 0 8 Such atten-
tion to semantics is understandable within the legal community, how-
ever, it is doubtful that a juror will dissect an instruction as keenly as
persons in the legal profession might.' 0 9 Also, it is not ascertainable
whether a juror will comprehend the purpose of the charge, even if she
is attentive to the wording of the instruction. In Brown, Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent that, "[ilt is simply unrealistic to assume that
an instruction ruling out several emotions in unqualified language
would be construed as a directive that certain forms of emotion are per-
missible while others are not.""i 0 Both the majority and dissent in
Brown attempt to make educated guesses regarding a juror's synthesis of
the instruction. But well thought out assumptions are small comfort to a
capital offense defendant.
The majority in Parks highlighted another important caveat to anti-
sympathy jury charges. During voir dire and closing arguments the
prosecutor made statements to the jury about sympathy and its relation
to the jury's determination."' In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit only
briefly discussed these remarks due to its previous determination that
the anti-sympathy instruction had violated the petitioner's eighth
amendment rights. However, the court commented strongly about the
prosecutor's behavior when it stated, "ft]he prosecutor's use of the
[anti-sympathy] instruction demonstrates how a general anti-sympathy
instruction may be used to reduce improperly the jury's consideration of
106. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
107. Id. at 548.
108. On June 13, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
an anti-sympathy jury instruction in Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988). The
instruction directed that the jurors should "not be influenced by sympathy, passion, preju-
dice, or public opinion." Id. at 1137. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court found in
State v. Copeland, 530 So. 2d 526 (La. 1988), that a jury charge which read, "You are not
to be influenced by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public opinion. You are to reach a
just verdict," was constitutional. Id at 537.
109. Justice Brennan in his dissent in Brown, noted that it can not be expected that
jurors will engage in the "tortuous reasoning process necessary to construe it [sympathy]
as 'unfettered sympathy.' " Brown, 479 U.S. at 550-51.
110. Brown, 479 U.S. at 550.
111. The prosecutor told the jury during voir dire that they would be given an anti-
sympathy instruction which would prohibit their sympathy, sentiment or prejudice to influ-
ence their decision. Then in closing the prosecutor stated, "[h]is [the defense counsel's]
closing arguments are really a pitch to you for sympathy-sympathy, or sentiment ... and
you told me in voir dire you wouldn't do that . . . .You leave the sympathy, and the
sentiment and prejudice part out of it." Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.
1988). In direct response to the prosecutor's behavior, the Tenth Circuit asserted, "Thus,
the prosecutor relied on the antisympathy [sic] instruction to overcome the defense coun-
sel's arguments regarding mitigation and mercy." Id. at 1559.
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mitigating circumstances."' 12
V. CONCLUSION
Obviously, prosecutorial statements which will corrupt the funda-
mental fairness of a trial are forbidden. However, recognition of an im-
permissible comment is not always easy, and it is the gray areas of the
process that cause difficulty. In order to assure the defendant a fair
judgment, the courts should not rely on the defense to equalize the pro-
ceedings. Instead, the judiciary must become more assertive about nul-
lifying any misconceptions created by the opposing counsel's
statements.
Although it is crucial for prejudice to be banned from the court-
room, it seems unlikely that a jury charge will accomplish this task. It
appears, however, the trend for the future will include similar charges.
Therefore, courts should endeavor to explain the intent of an anti-sym-
pathy instruction to the jury when such a charge is applied in the sen-
tencing phase of a trial. Unfortunately, this precaution will not remedy
the danger of misleading the jury as to the role emotion may play in




113. There has been strong criticism that criminal law is racially biased. For a detailed
study of the affect of racial bias in capital punishment verdicts see White, Juror Decision
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 113 (1987); Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capi-
tal Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
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